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Long Run Determinants of Real Exchange
Rates in Latin America
Jorge Carrera1 and Romain Restout2
Abstract
This paper investigates the long run behavior of real exchange rates in nineteen countries of Latin
America over the period 1970 - 2006. Our data does not support the Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP) hypothesis, implying that real shocks tend to have permanent effects on Latin America’s real
exchange rates. By exploiting the advantage of non stationary panel econometrics, we are able to
determinate factors that drive real exchanges rate in the long run : the Balassa-Samuelson effect,
government spending, the terms of trade, the openness degree, foreign capital flows and the de facto
nominal exchange regime. The latter effect has policy implications since we find that a fixed regime
tends to appreciate the real exchange rate. This finding shows the non neutrality of exchange rate
regime regarding its effects on real exchange rates. We also run estimations for country subgroups
(South America versus Caribbean and Central America). Regional results highlight that several real
exchange rates determinants are specific to one geographic zone. Finally, we compute equilibrium real
exchange rate estimations. Two main results are derived from the investigation of misalignments, [i ]
eight real exchange rates are quite close to their equilibrium level in 2006, and [ii ] our model shows
that a part of currencies crises that arose in Latin America was preceded by a real exchange rate
overvaluation.
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1 Introduction
Since 1970 until 2006, the Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER, hereafter)in Latin American countries
shows dynamics characterized by important swings and a strong volatility. Table 1 illustrates the average
level for the three last decades of nineteen countries form South and Central America. The REER level
of the 90´ s for the whole region was more depreciated than in the previous decades with a volatility
lower than in the 80´s. Exchange rate stabilization plans that were implemented in South America in
the early 90’s and the loosening of external gap with the arrivals of massive capital inflows possibly
contributed to reduce REER’s volatility. Except in the cases of Argentina and Peru, volatility reduction
was associated with a REER depreciation. With the adoption of exchange rate-based anchors, a large
part of Central American countries succeeded also to break down REER volatility during the 90’s. In
Costa Rica, Guatemala and Panama, REER’s volatility is extremely low compared to others countries.
Table 1: Real Effective Exchange Rates in Latin America (1970- 2006)
Volatility Average level (2000 = 100)
70 - 80 80 - 90 90 - 00 01 - 06 70 - 80 80 - 90 90 - 00 01 - 06
Argentina 0.57 0.71 0.25 0.46 66.81 42.28 98.15 53.69
Bolivia 0.23 0.33 0.13 0.11 166.10 181.00 107.44 94.43
Brazil 0.18 0.35 0.57 0.20 87.81 40.30 85.53 95.32
Chile 0.72 0.35 0.07 0.08 163.71 145.01 103.10 105.32
Colombia 0.07 0.27 0.18 0.12 136.60 127.50 106.97 100.85
Ecuador 0.11 0.35 0.20 0.04 226.65 193.35 116.25 148.32
Paraguay 0.17 0.38 0.21 0.08 196.30 305.52 118.99 93.77
Peru 0.25 0.32 0.21 0.04 49.36 36.05 95.85 101.18
Uruguay 0.19 0.24 0.15 0.10 74.73 93.03 92.48 78.95
Venezuela 0.04 0.38 0.33 0.17 100.17 89.10 63.18 76.95
South America 0.25 0.37 0.23 0.14 126.83 125.31 98.79 94.75
Costa Rica 0.07 0.30 0.05 0.03 193.10 102.44 98.93 97.39
Dominican Rep. 0.06 0.38 0.12 0.19 146.43 128.05 98.38 92.96
El Salvador 0.05 0.21 0.15 0.00 44.49 69.12 89.27 101.41
Guatemala 0.04 0.27 0.10 0.10 147.03 133.68 100.59 116.68
Honduras 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.02 127.89 150.03 82.78 101.66
Jamaica 0.14 0.26 0.27 0.07 139.40 101.54 83.35 95.51
Mexico 0.17 0.38 0.19 0.07 111.94 67.43 83.06 97.93
Panama 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.02 145.20 142.05 105.13 95.88
Trinidad & Tobago 0.06 0.16 0.12 0.03 96.60 120.74 104.06 108.71
Central America 0.08 0.23 0.13 0.06 128.01 112.79 93.95 100.90
Latin America 0.17 0.30 0.18 0.10 127.39 119.38 96.50 96.67
Notes : Author’s calculation based on IMF’s data.
Recently, it has been stressed that REER’s volatility and misalignments (compared to an equilibrium
level, see section 2 below) affect economic growth in developing countries. More exactly, recurrent and
large misalignments are linked to lower growth rates and current account deficits in the long run and
very frequently with currency and financial crisis. REER’s movements affect also internal production
and consumption allocations between non traded and traded goods. Aguirre and Caldero´n (2005) found
a non linear relation between economic performance and misalignments in a panel of sixty countries :
large overvaluations and undervaluations hurt growth, whereas small undervaluations can boost growth.
Considering the importance of the link between economic growth and REER misalignments for develop-
ing countries, the question of what are the determinants that drive the real exchange rate in the long
run is still a crucial issue. In the case of Latin America area, this question is reinforced by its inherent
external vulnerabilities. First, primary commodities trade still represents an important part of exports
(67 % 1). Since commodities prices are invoiced in U.S. dollars and mostly exogenous for Latin American
countries, real exchange rates fluctuations can lead to serious contractions of exports and trade balance.
Second, foreign capital inflows are an important but volatile element of Latin America growth2. In this
context, real exchange rate stability contributes to provide a stable macroeconomic environment that
in turn encourages capital inflows. And, finally external debt remains higher in many Latin American
1Data cover exports of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela (source : CEPAL, period 1990-2002).
2See IMF (2005) for a discussion of external financing flows impact on growth.
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countries, a large portion of these debts are indexed to exchange rate and/or denominated in foreign
currencies, leaving stocks of debt vulnerable to REER’s movements.
This paper have two main aims, first to investigate economic variables that influence the long run
real exchange rates’ paths. We consider a panel of nineteen countries of Latin and Central America. In
order to determine the relevant real exchange rate’s fundamentals, we use the more recent panel unit
roots and cointegration techniques. These fundamentals include the Balassa-Samuelson effect, govern-
ment spending, terms of trade, the degree of openness and foreign capital flows. This paper adds as
a determinant, the de facto nominal exchange rate regime which can have a potentially impact on the
real exchange rate. We follow the classification developed by Coudert and Dubert (2004) to identify
the de facto exchange regime. Second, based on cointegration results, we estimate equilibrium path for
the nineteen real exchange rates and then compute the degree of misalignment between the equilibrium
and the observed real exchange rate. Next, these misalignments are used to construct an early warning
indicator of currency crisis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on fundamentals of
real exchange rate. In section 3, we present the econometric methodology used to estimate the relationship
between the real exchange rate and its long run fundamentals. Section 4 deals with empirical estimations
and analysis of the results. It describes the data used in the regressions, presents cointegration regression
results and computes real exchange rate misalignments. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The Determinants of the Real Exchange Rate
In this work, we define the real exchange rate (q) as the relative price of the non traded to the traded
goods, i.e.:
q =
pN
pT
, (1)
where pN and pT are respectively the price of non traded and traded goods3. This definition is called the
internal real exchange rate and is appropriate for developing countries whose exports are predominantly
primary products subject to the law of one price, i.e. p∗T = e pT , where e is the nominal exchange rate
and p∗T is the foreign price of traded goods. As noted by Edwards (1989), this definition provides a
consistent index of the country’s tradable sector competitiveness and also guides the resource allocation
since an increase in q causes a shifting of resources away from the traded to the non traded sector.
According to definition (1), the real exchange rate’s path is only driven by the dynamic of the internal
relative price of non traded goods. This result depends upon two hypotheses [i] the law of one price
is valid for the traded goods and [ii] the country is too small to have an influence on foreign partners’
relative prices. Formally, introducing the common definition of the real exchange rate (in logarithm)
as log q = log e + log p − log p∗, where p and p∗ are respectively the national and foreign total price
indices, and assuming that log p and log p∗ can be split into traded and non traded prices as log p =
(1 − α) log pT + α log pN , and log p∗ = (1 − α) log p∗T + α log p∗N , with log p∗N the price of foreign non
traded goods and α being the share of the non traded sector in GDP at home and abroad, the real
exchange rate log q can be decomposed in two components :
log q = (log e+ log pT − log p∗T ) + α [(log pN − log pT )− (log p∗N − log p∗T )] (2)
Under the hypotheses [i ] and [ii ], the first term in (2) vanishes and (log p∗N − log p∗T ) is given4. Thus, the
real exchange rate varies only with the domestic relative price of non traded goods, (log pN − log pT ).
Several theoretical models of real exchange rate determination were implemented recently for devel-
oping countries, including Edwards (1989, 1994), Elbadawi (1994), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), Montiel
(1999) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004). Except Edwards (1994) and Elbadawi (1994) ones, all these
models are based on strong microfundations with a representative agent which maximizes his intertem-
poral utility in a two sectors framework (a traded and a non traded ones). However, these models differ
from underlying hypotheses on which they are based. Whereas the model of Edwards (1989) assumes
perfect competition and constant returns to scale in both sectors, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) consider
3According to (1) a real appreciation (depreciation) is reflected by an increase (decrease) in q. See Edwards (1989),
Williamson (1994) and Edwards and Savastano (1999) for discussions about theoretical foundations of this real exchange
rate concept.
4Here we impose a common value for α in both countries. If α 6= α∗, equation (2) has the general form :
log q = (log e+ log pT − log p∗T ) + α (log pN − log pT )− α∗ (log p∗N − log p∗T ) .
Under assumptions [i ] and [ii ], the real exchange rate still reduces to (log pN − log pT ).
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that the non traded goods are produced under a monopolistic competition structure and with a produc-
tion function characterized by diminishing returns to scale5. Except Montiel’s model, the others ones
assume a perfect world capital market, the domestic interest rate reaches the exogenously given world
interest rate. However, world markets capital are used to claim risk premium for developing countries.
Montiel incorporates this idea in his model by assuming that the economy faces an upward-sloping sched-
ule relating the domestic interest rate to a country-specific risk premium that increases with the national
stock of debt.
Despite these theoretical differences, previous models are similar in several points. First, they are
based on the single equation approach that allows to derive a reduced form for the long run equilibrium
real exchange rate. According to Edwards’ (1989) definition, the equilibrium real exchange rate is defined
as the relative price of non traded to traded goods that is compatible with the simultaneous attainment of
the internal and external equilibrium. Internal equilibrium is achieved when non traded goods and labor
markets clear. External equilibrium is related to the intertemporal budget constraint, i.e. the economy
is intertemporally solvent.
Second, the equilibrium real exchange rate is long run driven by a set of foreign and domestic real variables,
called fundamentals by Edwards and Savastano (1999). Usually, theoretical models link the equilibrium
real exchange rate with government spending, sectoral productivity differentials (the Balassa-Samuelson
effect), terms of trade, country’s openness to international trade, foreign capital inflows and net foreign
assets among other variables. In the short run, both real and nominal variables affect the equilibrium real
exchange rate (see Edwards, 1989), but it responds only to fundamentals variations in the long run. Thus,
all these theoretical approaches reject models based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), the equilibrium
real exchange rate is not an immutable value but it varies through time. Real exchange rate movements
do not necessarily reflect disequilibrium situations, fundamentals variations generate endogenously real
exchange rate fluctuations. Moreover, it assumes that the actual real exchange rate is mean reverting,
i.e. it returns rapidly to its equilibrium value in the long run. Here, misalignments that can arise due to
an inadequate macroeconomic policies for example, are only temporary.
Finally, the equilibrium real exchange rate can be calculated by an appropriate use of econometric tech-
niques. In empirical terms, a baseline equation for the long run equilibrium real exchange rate can be
estimated, that is :
qt = β′Xt + εt, (3)
where Xt are the fundamentals, β the vector of long run parameters and εt an error term. To construct
the equilibrium real exchange rate path, noted q¯t, Clark and MacDonald (1999) suggest to use sustainable
values or the permanent component of fundamentals. By estimating (3) with a consistent econometric
method, we can obtain the equilibrium path for real exchange rate :
q¯t = βˆ′X
p
t , (4)
where the vector βˆ contains efficient estimators of β and Xpt is the permanent component of the fun-
damentals which can be computed from time series decomposition techniques (Hodrick-Prescott filter,
Beveridge-Nelson decomposition or Gonzalo-Granger methodology). From (4), the real exchange rate
misalignment, qdt , is computed as the deviation of the observed real exchange rate, qt, from its equilib-
rium level, that is qdt ≡ qt − q¯t = qt − βˆ′Xpt .
In this paper, we follow the single equation approach in order to determine fundamentals that drive
evolutions of long run real exchange rates in the Latin America region. Since the literature on theoretical
models of real exchange rate determination is abundant, we mainly focus here on the empirical application
of these models, i.e. we estimate a long run relationship between the real exchange rate and a limited
number of fundamentals which have a theoretical influence on long run real exchange rate according to
models presented below. The existent empirical literature on equilibrium real exchange rates in Latin
America suggests that only a restricted number of real variables seems to influence the real exchange rate
in the long run6. These variables include a Balassa-Samuelson effect, government spending, terms of trade,
degree of openness and capital inflows7. By adopting this empirical approach, our goal is not to valid
or to reject any particular real exchange rate model quoted previously but is to study dynamics of real
exchange rates with the help of non stationary panel data econometrics methods. Moreover, as shown by
Edwards and Savastano (1999), the choice and the number of fundamentals included in the real exchange
rate equation is model dependent. For example, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s (2004) model do not include
5Montiel (1999) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) also assume diminishing marginal returns technologies but keep the
assumption of perfect competition in both sectors.
6See Edwards (1989), Gay and Pellegrini (2003), Alberola (2003), Escude´ and Garegnagni (2005) for recent empirical
investigations.
7The choice of fundamentals is obviously constraints by data availability.
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government spending as a determinant for the real exchange rate, whereas the Balassa-Samuelson effect
is not explicitly derived from models of Edwards (1989,1994) and Elbadawi (1994). Thus, by adopting an
empirical approach, we do not restrict our analysis to be consistent with the reduced form of a particular
model, and we are allow to include the most important fundamentals in the long run real exchange rate
equation.
2.1 Productivity Effect
The productivity effect refers to the Balassa-Samuelson model (Balassa, 1964 and Samuelson, 1964).
According to this hypothesis, the relative price of non traded goods, q, is determined by the traded-
non traded productivity differential. The explanation is the following. Consider a two sectors economy
(traded-non traded) where wages are the same in both sectors and are linked to productivity in the open
sector. Assume that the law of one price holds in the traded sector and that the interest rate is entirely
exogenous. When productivity improves faster in the traded sector than in the non traded sector, wages
are expected to rise in the entire economy. In the non traded sector where the wage increase is unmatched
by an equivalent productivity improvement, the price pN is expected to rise. This in turn leads to an
increase in the relative price of non traded goods q, i.e. an appreciation of the home country’s real
exchange rate. Assuming a Cobb Douglas production function with constant returns to scale in both
sectors (YT = ATK1−αT L
α
T and YN = ANK
1−β
N L
β
N , where Ai, Li andKi represent respectively total factor
productivity, labor and capital in sector i, i = T,N), the formal expression of the Balassa-Samuelson
effect is :
qˆ ≡ pˆN − pˆT = β
α
AˆT − AˆN , (5)
where a hat above a variable denotes growth rate8. Thus, according to equation (5), the real exchange
rate depends entirely on productivity differentials. Moreover, the Balassa-Samuelson effect can be also
interpreted as the effect of the economic development on real exchange rate, i.e. fast growing countries
tend to experience a real appreciation of their exchange rate.
2.2 Government Spending
A crucial feature of the Balassa-Samuelson model is that the real exchange rate is fully determined by
the supply side of the economy, demand factors do not matter. As noted by Froot and Rogoff (1995) and
De Gregorio et al. (1994), this result depends on assumptions of the Balassa-Samuelson model. Demand
factors can have an effect on the relative price of non traded goods if one of the following assumptions is
relaxed : perfect competition in goods markets, factors move freely between the two sectors of production,
capital is mobile internationally, law of one price for traded goods and constant returns to scale in the two
sectors. By introducing monopolistic competition in the non traded sector in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s
(2004) model, Aguirre and Caldero´n (2005) allow for demand factors to influence the real exchange in the
long run. The impact of public demand on real exchange rate is traditionally linked to the hypothesis that
government spending generally falls disproportionately on non traded goods. An increase in government
spending exercises an upward pressure on the relative price of non traded goods and thus appreciates the
real exchange rate.
2.3 Terms of Trade
All theoretical models quoted previously stress the importance of terms of trade disturbances as a potential
source of real exchange rate fluctuations. However, the impact of a terms of trade worsening on the
real exchange rate is theoretically undefined because two contrary effects play in opposite way. First, a
deterioration of terms of trade induces a negative income effect (decline in the domestic purchasing power)
and results in a reduction in the private demand for non traded goods and then to a real depreciation of
the exchange rate. On the other hand, a substitution effect makes the consumption of imported goods
relatively more expensive. As a result there is a shift of demand in favor of the non traded goods,
the reestablishment of the equilibrium in the non traded market is provided by an increase of the real
exchange rate. The total effect of a terms of trade deterioration on real exchange rate depends on the
strength of the income and substitution effects. However, recent empirical studies found that the income
effect is predominant, hence, terms of trade improvements are associated with real appreciation in the
long run.
8The formal derivation of equation (5) can be found in Froot and Rogoff (1994) and De Gregorio et al. (1994).
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2.4 Openness
The degree of openness influences the real exchange rate through two main channels. The first one stands
that trade-liberalizing reforms tend to depreciate the long run real exchange rate. An increase in the
openness variable, such as a reduction in tariff, leads to a decline in the domestic price of imported goods.
This in turn entails an excess demand for imported goods and reduces domestic demand for the non traded
good9. As a result, the real exchange rate depreciates to restore the equilibrium in the non traded market.
The second theoretical influence channel between real exchange rate and degree of openness has been
emphasized by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) and Hau (2002). According to their models’ predictions, real
exchange rate volatility is negatively related to economic openness. Since the non traded sector is the
locus of the monopoly, non traded goods increase the degree of aggregate price rigidity, whereas traded
goods permits the convergence of the domestic price indice. Following a real shock, larger real exchange
rate changes are needed for a more closed economy to restore equilibrium on domestic markets. As noted
by Hau (2002), more open countries behave more like flexible prices economies with smaller real exchange
rate fluctuations since more imported goods provide a channel for quick adjustment of the national price
indice. Using a panel of forty eight countries (including eight countries from Latin America), Hau (2002)
provided evidence of the negative relationship between real exchange rate volatility and trade openness.
2.5 Capital Flows and Net Foreign Assets
According to Corden (1994), the impact of foreign capital flows on the real exchange rate refers to the real
exchange rate problem, that is capital inflows are associated with real exchange rate appreciation in the
long run. The intuition for this effect is straightforward. A foreign capital surge affects the economy by
raising the domestic absorption which leads to an increase in consumption demand for both traded and
non traded goods. On non traded goods market, this excess demand has to matched to a proportional
increase of the non traded supply in order to ensure market equilibrium. This in turn leads to a rise
of the price of non traded goods, pN . The traded consumption increase will cause the trade balance to
deteriorate without any effects on pT since it is entirely determined by the law of one price. According to
definition (1), the change in pN , following the foreign capital inflows, entails an appreciation of the real
exchange rate. Athukorala and Rajapatirana (2003) showed that the magnitude of real exchange rate
appreciation depends on the composition of foreign inflows. Foreign direct investment (FDI, hereafter)
tends to be more concentraded in the traded sector, and thus the appreciation resulting from a FDI entry
is lower compared to others types of capital inflows. In contrast, portfolio inflows bring a greater real
appreciation. Econometric results from Athukorala and Rajapatirana (2003) suggest that the composition
of capital flows matters in determining their impact on the real exchange rate. Moreover, comparing the
effect of FDI and portfolio on real exchange rates in Latin America and Asia, they can conclude that the
degree of real appreciation following a portfolio inflows is stronger in Latin America countries than in
Asia.
The relationship between net foreign asset (NFA, hereafter) positions and the real exchange rate has
been analyzed by several theoretical models (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995, and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti,
2004) which predict that debtor (creditor) countries having more depreciated (appreciated) real exchange
rates (the transfer problem). Indeed, countries with net foreign liabilities need to run trade surplus to
finance interests and dividends payments. Similarly, countries with positive NFA must have trade deficits.
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) claim that the transfer problem can also operate through the impact of wealth
effects on labor supply. A deterioration of the NFA position reduces national wealth. To prevent a large
drop in consumption, households rise their labor supply, thus increasing the non traded goods supply.
Since the non traded goods market is in equilibrium each period, the price pN has to fall, i.e. the real
exchange rate depreciates.
2.6 Nominal Exchange Rate Regime
The effect of exchange rate regime on real exchange rate is a controversial issue both in theoretical and
empirical terms. In traditional literature the dynamics of potential misalignments depends on the level
of price stickiness and financial openness. From the point of view of some theories like the equilibrium
ones the regime is neutral regarding the level or volatility of real exchange rate for Baxter and Stockman
(1989), Flood and Rose (1995), and, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000). Recent equilibrium literature based
on nominal rigidities or market imperfections tends to find non neutrality between these variables but is
highly dependent of the type of imperfection that is highlighted.
9Unlike in the case of terms of trade shocks, the income effect is absent following a fall in the tariff rate. Indeed, the
tariff reduction has to be financed by an increase in taxes (we assume here that the government budget is balanced in every
period), which in turn offsets the initial wealth effect induced by the reduction of the imported goods price.
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From a different perspective the literature on exchange rate-based stabilizations applied to Latin
America countries normally remarks the strong effects of fixation on real exchange rate levels. The stylized
fact is the following: when a country suffered from high inflation, one of the most popular alternatives
in the last three decades was to implement a fixation of (nominal) exchange rate, sometimes it happens
after a strong devaluation. Because of the high inertial dynamic of inflation the changes in prices and
wages tends to persist and so the fixed exchange rate regime is associated with a persistent appreciation
of real exchange rate. In several papers Calvo has remarked the credibility problem associated with this
appreciation following to an exchange regime stabilization plan (Calvo and Vegh, 1993). Normally non
credible exchange regime stabilizations are followed by a boom in the consumption of non traded goods,
so we expect that rigid exchange rate regimes lead to real exchange rate appreciation.
Moreover, according to IMF (2005) exchange rates stabilization plans introduced in Latin America
countries in the early 90’s encouraged an external capital inflows surge that appreciated the real exchange
rates. By adopting a fixed regime, a country provides, at least in the short run, a perceived stable
environment which in turn attracts foreign capital inflows. To maintain the desired parity of the nominal
exchange rate the central bank is forced to purchase these excessive flows, leading to an increase of the
domestic money base if the central bank does not run sterilization operations. This expansion of the
domestic credit supply has lead in the Latin America zone to consumption of non traded goods boom
which in turn has appreciated the real exchange rate.
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) show that there are important distortions between de jure exchange regime
(the official one that is reported to IMF) and the de facto regime which reflects the policy pursuing by
the country. Table 2 shows the distribution percentage of fixed de facto exchange rate regime in the total
sample period. It is possible to perceive that in the seventies 76 % of the time was on average under
a fixed exchange rate regime. This percentage decreases in the following decades reaching 58 % in the
present century. For example in Central America there was in the 90´s an intense increase in the trade
and financial relationships with United States and the dollarization of the economies but the regime is
more flexible than in the previous decades.
Table 2: Exchange Rate Regime Distribution (1970 -2006)
Percentage of fix regimes
70 - 80 80 - 90 90 - 00 01 - 06 70 - 06
Argentina 0.40 0.10 0.82 0.33 0.43
Bolivia 0.70 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.78
Brazil 0.60 0.40 0.27 0.00 0.35
Chile 0.20 0.60 0.64 0.17 0.43
Colombia 1.00 1.00 0.45 0.33 0.73
Ecuador 0.80 0.40 0.36 1.00 0.59
Paraguay 1.00 0.60 0.73 0.00 0.65
Peru 0.60 0.30 0.55 0.50 0.49
Uruguay 0.50 0.60 0.91 0.17 0.59
Venezuela 1.00 0.70 0.36 0.33 0.62
South America 0.68 0.54 0.61 0.38 0.57
Costa Rica 0.90 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.86
Dominican Rep. 1.00 0.60 0.55 0.33 0.65
El Salvador 1.00 0.90 0.82 1.00 0.92
Guatemala 1.00 0.70 0.55 0.67 0.73
Honduras 1.00 1.00 0.55 1.00 0.86
Jamaica 0.50 0.60 0.36 0.83 0.54
Mexico 0.80 0.50 0.45 0.33 0.54
Panama 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Trinidad & Tobago 0.40 0.80 0.73 1.00 0.70
Central America 0.84 0.74 0.67 0.80 0.76
Latin America 0.76 0.63 0.64 0.58 0.66
3 A Review of Panel Econometric Methods
In this section, we present panel unit root and cointegration techniques involved in our analysis. Given
our relatively short time span (T = 37), examining the long run behavior of real exchange rates by using
non stationary panel econometrics, instead of individual time series, yields substantial benefits.
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First, by allowing data to be pooled in the cross section dimension (N), panel unit root and cointegra-
tion tests gain power and outperform their conventional time series counterparts10 (i.e. Dickey-Fuller or
Engle-Granger tests). Moreover, panel data provide efficient estimators for cointegration vectors11 which
are superconsistent and converge at rate T
√
N while in time series dimension, the convergence is slower
at a rate T . So, even in the case of relatively small time and cross section dimensions, these estimators
are extremely precise.
Second, recent panel unit root and cointegration tests (see among others Im, Pesaran and Shin, 2003,
and Pedroni, 1999) take account of the heterogeneity across different members of the panel. This allows
us to test the presence of unit root and cointegration relation in the panel while permitting the short run
dynamics, error variances and fixed effects to be heterogeneous among individual members. As noted by
Alberola et al. (2003), this flexibility is useful for studies that only focus on the long run behavior of data
since the short run dynamics and the long run equilibrium are likely to be different across individuals.
Finally, by adding the cross section dimension, non stationary panel permits to limit the time span
of data, and so is able to reduce the presence of structural breaks since long time series include, poten-
tially, serious structural shifts. As shown first by Perron (1989), conventional time series unit root and
cointegration tests tend to be biased in the presence of structural breaks.
3.1 Panel Unit Root Tests
Because we mainly focus on the long run determinants of real exchange rates, we first test for unit root
in panel data. Here, we apply three unit root tests, the Wtbar test proposed by Im, Pesaran and Shin
(2003, hereafter, IPS), the Fisher type test suggested by Maddala and Wu (1999, hereafter, MW) and
the Hadri (1999) LM test. Whereas the latter takes as the null hypothesis of the stationarity against the
alternative of a unit root in panel data, IPS and MW considered the non stationarity (i.e. presence of
a unit root) as the null hypothesis. All these three tests are designed for cross sectionally independent
panels, i.e. there is no cointegration between pairs or groups of individuals in the across section dimension.
This assumption of independence across individuals is quite strong but essential in order to apply the
Lindberg-Levy central limit theorem that permits to derive limiting distributions of tests (Baltagi and
Kao, 2000)12.
Im et al. (2003) proposed a test that allows for residual correlation, and heterogeneity of the au-
toregressive root and error variances across individual members of the panel. IPS is based on the use of
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to each individual series. If we consider a sample of N cross sections
observed over T time periods, the following ADF regression is estimated for each individual i = 1, . . . , N
of the panel :
4yi,t = γzi,t + ρiyi,t−1 +
pi∑
j=1
θi,j4yi,t−j + εi,t, (6)
where zi,t is the deterministic component (fixed effects αi and/or individual time effect βi t), εi,t are
assumed to be identically, independently distributed (i.i.d.) across i and t with E(εi,t) = 0, E(ε2i,t) =
σ2i < ∞, and E(εi,t, εj,t) = 0 for all i 6= j. Notice that the lag length pi is permitted to vary across
individual members of the panel.
The null and alternative hypotheses are defined as :
H0 : ρi = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , N,
against
Ha : ρi < 0, for at least one i.
Thus, under the alternative hypothesis IPS allow for ρi to be individual specific, and in this sense, is
more general than the homogeneous alternative (i.e. ρi = ρ < 0 for all i) developed by Quah (1994) and
Levin and Lin (1992). The IPS test averages the individual ADF t-statistics (ti,T ) that are obtained from
estimating (6) for each i, that is t¯NT = N−1
∑N
i=1 ti,T . Im et al. (2003) proposed the standardized t¯NT
statistic :
Wtbar =
√
N
(
t¯NT −N−1
∑N
i=1 E [ti,T |ρi = 0]
)
√
N−1
∑N
i=1Var [ti,T |ρi = 0]
, (7)
10For example, with T = 50, the power of the standard Dickey-Fuller test is only 0.151. With N = 10, power of Levin
and Lin (1993) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) tests reaches 0.555 and 0.752, respectively.
11The various estimators include within and between Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS) and Dynamic OLS (DOLS) proposed
by Pedroni (2000, 2001) and Kao and Chiang (2000).
12O’Connell (1998) showed that PPP tests which ignore to control for cross sectional dependence suffer from significant
distortions.
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where E [ti,T |ρi = 0] and Var [ti,T |ρi = 0] are respectively the mean and the variance of ti,T 13. Under the
null hypothesis, the Wtbar statistic is asymptotically standard normal distributed.
Maddala and Wu (1999) proposed a Fisher type test based on the p-values from individual unit root
statistics, that is :
P = −2
N∑
i=1
ln(pi), (8)
where pi denotes the p-value of the individual unit roots test (ADF or Phillips-Perron (1988) for example)
applied to cross section i. Like IPS, MW permits heterogeneity of the autoregressive root ρi under the
alternative Ha. Under the assumption of cross sectional independence, P is distributed as a chi-squared
with 2N degrees of freedom.
Hadri (1999) proposed a residual base Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test of the null that the time series
for each i is stationary around a deterministic trend against the alternative of a unit root in the panel
data. Consider the following model :
yi,t = z′i,tγ + ri,t + εi,t, (9)
where zi,t is the deterministic component and ri,t a random walk process (ri,t = ri,t−1 + ui,t). The εi,t
and ui,t are independent and i.i.d. across i and t with E(εi,t) = 0, E(ε2i,t) = σ
2
ε , E(ui,t) = 0, E(u
2
i,t) = σ
2
u.
Using backward substitution, equation (9) can be written as :
yi,t = z′i,tγ + ei,t, (10)
where ei,t =
∑t
j=1 ui,j + εi,t . Let eˆi,t be the residuals from the regression (10) and σˆ
2
e be the consistent
estimator of the true variance σ2e under H0. Then, the LM statistic is :
LM =
1
σˆ2e
1
NT 2
(
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
S2i,t
)
,
where Si,t is the residual partial sum (Si,t =
∑t
j=1 eˆi,j). Under the null hypothesis of stationarity, the
statistic test :
Zµ =
√
N
(
LM − E
[∫ 1
0
V (r)2dr
])
√
Var
[∫ 1
0
V (r)2dr
] , (11)
is exactly standard normal distributed, where V (r) is a standard Brownian motion14.
Maddala and Wu (1999) investigated the finite sample performance of panel unit root tests. Since
IPS and Fisher tests have the same alternative hypothesis, they are directly comparable. The major
conclusion of their study is that the Fisher test seems superior to the IPS (the Fisher test has smaller
size distortions and comparable power). In an extensive study, Hlouskova and Wagner (2005) studied
performance of seven panel unit root tests including IPS, Fisher and Hadri-LM ones. They find that
the stationary LM test of Hadri (2000) performs very poorly and often leads to a rejection of the null
hypothesis15.
3.2 Tests of Panel Cointegration
Adding the cross section dimension in testing for cointegration should also offer the same advantages in
terms of power that are present when detecting for unit root. Several authors have recently proposed
alternative methodologies for testing cointegration in a panel data context 16. Using a multi-equation
framework, Larsson et al. (2001) presented a likelihood-based (LR) test for cointegration rank in het-
erogeneous panels based on the average of the individual rank trace statistics developed by Johansen
(1995)17. Kao (1999) and Pedroni (1999, 2004) proposed residuals based test for panel cointegration.
The tests proposed by Kao (1999) are ADF type tests similar to the classical approach adopted by Engle
13Simulated values of E
[
ti,T |ρi = 0
]
and Var
[
ti,T |ρi = 0
]
are provided by Im et al. (2003), table 3, page 66.
14The moments E
[∫ 1
0 V (r)
2dr
]
and Var
[∫ 1
0 V (r)
2dr
]
are derived exactly, whereas for IPS a simulation is needed.
15Hlouskova and Wagner restricted their investigation to the case of homogenous panels, so IPS and MW, that are
specially adapted from heterogeneous panels, appear to be disadvantaged by the imposition of homogeneity.
16Like when testing for unit root, tests of panel cointegration assume that the individual processes are independent and
i.i.d. cross sectionally.
17If the LR test allows for more than one cointegrating relations, the size of the test is severely distorted even if the panel
has large cross sectional and time dimensions.
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and Granger (1987). He developed five tests under the null hypothesis of no cointegration. All Kao’s tests
constrained the cointegration vector and short run dynamics to be homogeneous across the individual
members of the panel. This assumption of homogeneity has been relaxed by Pedroni (1999, 2004) who
developed tests that allow for considerable heterogeneity across individuals. Like the IPS unit root test,
Pedroni’s tests allow individual short run dynamics, individual fixed effects and also allow the cointegra-
tion vector to differ across members under the alternative hypothesis18. Pedroni considers the following
cointegration model with k regressors for a panel :
yi,t = γzi,t + β1,ix1,i,t + β2,ix2,i,t + · · ·+ βk,ixk,i,t + ei,t, (12)
where zi,t is the deterministic component (fixed effects αi and/or individual time effect δi t) and xi,t are
the k regressors which are assumed to be I(1) (i.e. xi,t = xi,t−1 + ui,t) and not cointegrated with each
other. Pedroni’s approach focuses on testing for unit roots in panel estimates of ei,t, that is :
eˆi,t = ρieˆi,t−1 + vi,t, (13)
where vi,t are assumed to be identically, independently distributed (i.i.d.) across i and t with E(vi,t) = 0,
E(v2i,t) = σ
2
i < ∞, and E(vi,t, vj,t) = 0 for all i 6= j. Pedroni (1999, 2004) considered seven tests (noted
χNT ) based on the residual from the regression (13). Four are based on pooling data along the within
dimension (panel-ν, panel-rho, panel non parametric-t and panel parametric-t) and three are calculated
pooling data along the between dimension of the panel (group-rho, group non parametric-t and group
parametric-t). Using the within approach, the test of the null of no cointegration is H0 : ρi = 1 for all i
against the alternative Ha : ρi = ρ < 1 for all i. Thus, all within statistics presume a common value
ρi = ρ, whereas the between estimators are less restrictive in that they allow for considerable heterogeneity
since the alternative hypothesis isHa : ρi < 1 for all i. The between statistics provide an additional source
of heterogeneity since the autoregressive coefficients, ρi, are allowed to vary across individual members of
the panel. Pedroni (1999, 2004) found that each of the seven within and between statistics are distributed
under the standard normal distribution as :
χNT − µ
√
N√
ν
⇒ N(0, 1), (14)
where χNT is the appropriately statistic and µ and ν are respectively the mean and the variance of
χNT
19.
Pedroni (2004) explored finite sample performances of the seven statistics. He showed that in terms
of power all the proposed statistics do fairly well for T > 90 and N = 20. In addition to be less
restrictive, Pedoni’s simulations showed that between statistics have lower small sample size distortions
than within ones. Moreover, for small time span (T < 20), the between group parametric-t statistic is
the most powerful. Given our relatively short time span (T = 37) and size adjusted power results found
by Pedroni (2004), we will only consider the group parametric-t statistic when testing for cointegration.
3.3 Estimation of Panel Cointegration Models
In a cointegrated system, only under restrictive conditions, i.e. exogeneity of the regressors and homo-
geneity of the dynamics across members of the panel, the OLS estimator for the cointegrating vector is
asymptotically consistent and has a standardized distribution. Otherwise, the OLS estimator is biased
and its asymptotic distribution will be dependent on nuisance parameters associated with the dynamics
of the underlying system (Pedroni, 2000). Like testing for unit roots and for cointegration, alternatives
procedures are proposed to provide efficient cointegrating vector estimators and thus to infer in the coin-
tegrated panel model. The recent various approaches include within and between estimators of the Fully
Modified OLS (FMOLS) and Dynamic OLS (DOLS). FMOLS is a non-parametric approach to adjusting
for the effects of endogenous regressors and serial correlation while DOLS estimator adds leads and lags
of first differences regressors in the cointegrating equation to correct these issues.
Pedroni (2001) argues that between (or group-mean) estimators allow for greater flexibility in esti-
mating cointegrating vectors, in the sense that group-mean estimators can be interpreted as the mean
value of the individual cointegrating vectors. Pesaran and Smith (1995) found that, when the cointegrat-
ing vectors are heterogeneous across individuals, group-mean estimators provide consistent estimates of
the sample mean of the heterogeneous cointegrating vectors, while within dimension estimators do not.
Furthermore, group-mean estimators allow for heterogeneity when inferencing in the cointegrating vector.
Within estimators test the null hypothesis H0 : βi = β0 for all i against the alternative Ha : βi = βa 6= β0
18Endogeneity of the regressors is also allowed by Pedroni’s tests, which contrats with Kao’s (1999) approach where
homogeneity and exogeneity are imposed.
19See table 2, page 666 of Pedroni (1999) for values of µ and ν.
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where β is the cointegrating vector and βa is the same value for all i. Group-mean estimators are designed
to test the null hypothesis H0 : βi = β0 for all i against the alternative Ha : βi 6= β0, so that heterogeneity
is allowed and all the individual βi are not constrained to have a common βa value. Finally, Pedroni
(2000) investigated the finite sample of the two within FMOLS (residual-FMOLS and adjusted-FMOLS)
and of the group-mean FMOLS. He found that the group-mean FMOLS suffers from much lower small
sample size distortions than the within estimators.
The group-mean FMOLS estimator is based on the estimation of the following cointegrated system
for a panel :
yi,t = αi + x′i,tβ + ui,t,
xi,t = xi,t−1 + εi,t, (15)
where αi are the fixed effects, β is a k × 1 vector of the slope parameters, xi,t is a k × 1 vector of
integrated regressors, and the vector error process ξi,t = (ui,t, εi,t′)′ is a stationary process with an
asymptotic covariance matrix Ωi, which can be decomposed as :
Ωi ≡
[
Ωui Ωuεi
Ωεui Ωεi
]
= Ω0i + Γi + Γ
′
i,
=
[
Ω0ui Ω
0
uεi
Ω0εui Ω
0
εi
]
+
[
Γui Γuεi
Γεui Γεi
]
+
[
Γ′ui Γuεi
Γεui Γ
′
εi
]
,
where Ω0i is the contemporaneous covariance and Γi is a weighted sum of auto-covariances. Ωui refers
to the long run variance of the residual ui,t, Ωεi is the (k × k) long run covariance among the εi,t and
Ωεui is a (k × 1) vector that gives the long run covariance between ui,t and εi,t. Note that the Ωεui
captures the endogenous feedback effect between yi,t and xi,t. Thus, by considering this feedback effect,
the group-mean FMOLS estimator eliminates the bias due to the endogeneity of the regressors, that is :
βˆFM = N−1
N∑
i=1
(
T∑
t=1
(xi,t − x¯i)(xi,t − x¯i)′
)−1( T∑
t=1
(xi,t − x¯i)y∗i,t − T γˆi
)
, (16)
where
y∗i,t = (yi,t − y¯i)−
Ωˆεui
Ωˆεi
4xi,t, γˆi ≡ Γˆεui + Ωˆ0εui −
Ωˆεui
Ωˆεi
(
Γˆεi + Ωˆ
0
εi
)
,
and y¯i (x¯i) is the simple average of yi,t (xi,t) over the cross section dimension (i.e. y¯i = N−1
∑N
i=1 yi,t
and x¯i = N−1
∑N
i=1 xi,t). Under the assumption of cross sectional independence (i.e. E
[
ξi,t, ξ
′
j,t
]
= 0
for all i 6= j), Pedroni (2000) showed that the group-mean FMOLS is asymptotically unbiased and its
t-statistic is standard normal :
T
√
N
(
βˆFM − β
)
⇒ N(0, ν),
tβˆFM ⇒ N(0, 1), (17)
where ν depends of x¯i, y¯i and of the dimension of xi,t, k20. The group-mean FMOLS estimator is
consistent and converges at rate T
√
N to β, so even when T and N are relatively small, βˆFM is relatively
precise. Finally, in the expression (16), βˆFM follows a summation over the cross sectional dimension, it
can also be constructed as the average of the conventional time series FMOLS estimator applied to the
ith member of the panel as βˆFM = N−1
∑N
i=1 βˆFM,i, where βˆFM,i is the individual time series FMOLS
estimator. Likewise, the group mean t-statistic can be computed as tβˆFM = N
−1/2∑N
i=1 tβˆFM,i , where
tβˆFM,i is the t-statistic of the individual FMOLS estimator.
The group-mean DOLS estimator, proposed by Pedroni (2001) adds leads and lags of 4xi,t (i.e.∑q
j=−q4xi,t+q) as additional regressors in (15). This correction allows to take care of a possible en-
dogeneity of the regressors and to correct for correlation between ui,t and εi,t. Kao and Chiang (2000)
showed the superiority of the within DOLS over the within FMOLS. To our knowledge, a comparison
of group-mean FMOLS and group-mean DOLS finite sample properties has not yet been investigated
by empirical studies21. According to us, the DOLS estimator suffers from two drawbacks. First, DOLS
estimators are very sensitive to the number of leads and lags included in the regression, small sample
properties of these estimators are improved when adding leads and lags (see Kao and Chiang, 2000).
20When k = 1 and x¯i = y¯i = 0, ν = 2, if x¯i and/or y¯i 6= 0, ν = 6.
21However, Pedroni’s (2000) Monte Carlo simulations reveal that the group-mean DOLS has relatively small size distortion
relative to the within DOLS estimator.
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Moreover, there is no statistical methodology to choose the optimal number of leads and lags for the
DOLS estimators (within or group-mean). Second, given our relatively limited time span (T = 37), even
for a DOLS estimator with only one lead and one lag the number of degrees of freedom is quite short.
For example, with k = 5, the total number or regressors is the cointegrating relation is twenty for the
DOLS estimator with one lead and one lag, leaving only seventeen degrees of freedom when T is set to
thirty seven.
4 Empirical Results
Our sample is based on data availability and included 19 countries of Latin America : Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. The sample
covers the period 1970-2006 (T = 37) and data are annual. The variables used in this section are the
real effective exchange rate (qi,t), government spending (gi,t), the productivity differential (prodi,t), the
financial capital inflows (fcii,t), the foreign direct investment (fdii,t), the net foreign assets (nfai,t),
the terms of trade (toti,t), the openness (openi,t) and the de facto exchange rate regime (regi,t) for
i = 1, . . . , 19 and t = 1, . . . , 37.
4.1 The Data : Sources and Construction
Data is drawn from IMF (International Financial Statistics, IFS, and Direction of Trade Statistics, DTS ),
World Bank (World Development Indicators, WDI ) and CEPAL (Statistical Yearbook) databases.
The real effective exchange rate of the country i at time t is constructed as the geometrical weighted
average of the real bilateral exchange rates vis-a-vis its ten main trading partners :
qi,t =
10∏
j=1
(
Pi,t
Eij,t Pj,t
)ωj,t
,
where Pi,t and Pj,t are domestic and foreign CPI price indexes respectively, Eij,t is the nominal exchange
rate (in units of domestic currency). ωj,t is the 3-years moving average trade weight of partner j in total
trade of the home country i. Prices and nominal exchange rates series are taken from IMF-IFS database.
Trade weights were constructed using countries’ exportations and importations data from IMF-DTS
database. All qi,t are expressed as an index (100 = 2000) and converted in logarithms. According to our
definition, an increase in qi,t represents an appreciation of the real exchange rate.
For government spending, gi,t, we take the share of government consumption in the GDP extracted
from World Bank-WDI database.
Due to the lack of data availability on sectorial productivity, the GDP per capita relative to trading
partners was used as a proxy for the Balassa-Samuelson effect (prodi,t). Partner countries’ weights are the
same as those used in the construction of qi,t. GDP per capita data were taken from World Bank-WDI
database. The recent empirical literature on the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis has often focused on total
factor productivity (i.e. Solow residual) or labor productivity differentials between non traded and traded
sectors to explain real exchange rate movements22. However, these data are unavailable for developing
countries. As discussed by Canzoneri et al. (1999), the Solow residual specification as a proxy for the
Balassa-Samuelson is subject to a variety of limitations : first, it tends to be correlated with variations
in aggregate demand23, second, Solow residual involves data on sectoral labor and capital stock and
estimates of labor’s share in production that are mostly unavailable for developing countries, and third it
is generally associated with a Cobb-Douglas production function which is a restrictive assumption. The
ratio of the consumer price index (CPI) to the producer price index (PPI) is also often used as a proxy
for the relative productivity effect (see DeLoach, 2001, Alberola, 2003, Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al., 2004 for
recent applications)24. Like for sectorial labor and production data, PPI indexes are unavailable for a
large part of Latin America countries (only eleven countries provide a PPI index with a sufficient time
span).
22See, among others, De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1994), Asea and Mendoza (1994), Chinn and Johnston (1997),
Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (1999) and Lee and Tang (2003).
23See Hall (1988). Coto-Martinez (2000) and, Coto-Martinez and Reboredo (2003) studied the effect of the fiscal policy
on Solow residual.
24DeLoach (2001) argues that the logarithms of CPI and PPI are composed of traded and non traded goods such that
CPI ≡ αpN + (1 − α)pT and PPI ≡ βpN + (1 − β)pT , where pN and pT are respectively the price of non traded and
traded goods. The relative price of non traded goods can be expressed as : pN − pT = (α− β)−1(CPI − PPI). Assuming
that α > β, an increase in (CPI − PPI) leads to an increase in the relative price of non traded goods.
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Following Athukorala and Rajapatirana (2003), we construct the financial capital inflows as :
fcii,t =
(PIAi,t +OIAi,t)− (PILi,t +OILi,t)
GDPi,t
,
where PI and OI are respectively portfolio investments and others investments, with the letter A indicating
assets and the letter L liabilities. Others investments cover both private flows (bank loans) and public
flows (monetary authorities and general government). PI and OI are both expressed in U.S. dollars
(source : CEPAL). GDPi,t is the nominal GDP of the country i, also expressed in U.S. dollars (source :
World Bank-WDI database).
We define the foreign direct investment, fdii,t, as :
fdii,t =
DIEi,t −DIAi,t
GDPi,t
,
where DIEi,t are direct investment in the country i, and DIAi,t are direct investment abroad (source :
CEPAL). DIEi,t, DIAi,t and GDPi,t are all expressed in U.S. dollars.
The variable nfai,t is the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP, both expressed in U.S. dollars. Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2001) provide net foreign assets data for the period 1970-2003. We updated the database
to 2006 using the following construction25 :
4NFAi,t = CAi,t +KAi,t, (18)
where NFAi,t is the net foreign assets in U.S dollars, CAi,t is the current account and KAi,t is the
capital account balance (source : IMF-IFS database). Data for Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua are not
provided in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s database. Thus, we estimated NFAi,t for the period 1971-2006
using equation (18). As initial value for 1970, we took the total external debt of each country (source :
World Bank-WDI database).
The terms of trade, totit is defined as the ratio of country’s export price index to its import price
index (source : CEPAL). Terms of trade are expressed as an index (100 = 2000).
The openness (openi,t) is the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP. All variables are in U.S. dollars
(source : World Bank-WDI database).
We apply the methodology proposed by Coudert and Dubert (2005) to identify the de facto exchange
rate regime (regi,t) for our sample of countries26. This classification is based on three statistical criteria.
The first one consists on the estimations of annual trends in the (monthly) nominal exchange rate level
in order to distinguish crawling peg from peg regimes. The second criterion allows to separate fixed
regimes (pegs and crawling peg) to flexible ones (pure and managed float) by building a comparison
test of nominal exchange rate volatility between the Latin America country and a benchmark group of
floating currencies. Then, for regimes classified as pure float or managed float in former steps, a third
test is applied to distinguish between these two types of regime. More precisely, it is a comparison test
of percentage change of official reserves variance with the benchmark group. Thus, we construct our de
facto regime dummy variable which stands 1 for a fixed regime (peg or crawling peg) and 0 for a flexible
regime (pure or managed float).
4.2 Unit Root Tests
Before determining the long run determinants of real exchange rates in Latin America, we first apply panel
unit root tests presented in section 3.1 to our series. All these tests are designed under the assumption
of cross section independence. O’Connell (1998) emphasized the importance of controlling for cross
sectional dependence when testing for unit roots in panels of real exchange rates. Without taking care of
correlation between individuals of the panel, he rejected the null hypothesis of unit root in a panel of 64
real exchange rates. By contrast, when controlling for cross sectional correlation, no evidence against the
unit root null hypothesis can be found in all the sample and in four geographic sub-samples. Moreover,
O’Connell showed that cross sectional dependence adversely affects size and power of panel unit root
tests. For controlling for such dependence, one can demean the data over the cross section dimension by
subtracting average such as x∗i,t = xi,t−N−1
∑N
i=1 xi,t. Results of panel unit root tests on original
27 and
demeaned series are given in table 3.
25This construction is equivalent to equation (5) in Milesi-Ferretti (2001).
26See appendix A for further details.
27The variables qi,t, gi,t, prodi,t, openi,t and toti,t are directly converted in logarithms. nfai,t is directly expressed as
ratio of GDP. The variables fcii,t and fdii,t, which are also expressed as ratio of GDP are converted into logarithms as
ln(1 +X).
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Table 3: Panel unit root tests results (series in levels)
Original series Demeaned series
IPS MW LM IPS MW LM
qi,t -0.826 39.791 6.762* -1.152 43.345 6.928*
gi,t -0.869 36.326 5.470* -0.877 40.606 5.732*
prodi,t 0.873 26.892 7.908* -0.308 37.135 8.668*
fcii,t -2.484* 55.645* 2.696* -3.123* 61.015* 2.892*
fdii,t -2.041* 55.102* 5.917* -1.337 45.819 6.832*
nfai,t 0.607 36.249 8.255* 0.101 34.458 7.631*
openi,t -0.998 47.681 7.409* -1.177 43.569 7.649*
toti,t -4.290* 88.742* 5.864* -5.004* 100.316* 5.891*
Notes : Critical value at the 5 % significance level for a χ2 is 53.38 with 2N = 38,
is 1.64 for a N(0,1). * : rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5 % significance level.
Applied to original series, the IPS and MW tests indicate that the null hypothesis of non stationarity
can not be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis of stationarity at the 5 % significance level
for all variables except for the financial capital inflows (fcii,t, ) the foreign direct investments (fdii,t)
and the terms of trade (toti,t). However, when controlling for cross sectional dependence, IPS and MW
do not reject the null hypothesis of unit root for the foreign direct investments variable. This result
implies a common feature in the evolution of FDI flows to Latin America zone28. For all other variables,
tests results are consistent whatever the specification of series and thus support the hypothesis of a weak
correlation between individuals among the variables of the panel. For the terms of trade, even when using
the demeaned series, IPS and MW tests do not reject the null hypothesis of non stationarity at the 5
% significance level. The presence of a common structural break for terms of trade during the 70’s can
being a possible explanation for this puzzle.
Finally, the LM-Hadri test clearly rejects the null hypothesis of stationarity for all variables. However,
Hlouskova and Wagner (2005) found that this test has poor size and often leads to over-rejection of the
null hypothesis, so they suggest to use the Hadri test in order to find unit root since rejection of the null
does not imply acceptance of the alternative of unit root. Thus, when rejecting the null hypothesis of
stationary, the LM test results have to be taken with caution.
In order to determine the order of integration of our series, we apply the panel unit roots to series in
first differences. The results are reported in table 4.
Table 4: Panel unit root tests results (series in first differences)
Original series Demeaned series
IPS MW LM IPS MW LM
4qi,t -8.415* 147.278* -1.817 -8.648* 152.227* -1.817
4gi,t -6.256* 113.843* -0.873 -7.065* 130.960* -0.949
4prodi,t -5.648* 97.559* 0.298 -6.593* 113.597* 1.031
4fcii,t -10.071* 178.443* -2.553 -10.892* 193.545* -2.538
4fdii,t -8.539* 150.116* -0.093 -8.969* 157.970* -0.253
4nfai,t -5.310* 95.506* 0.358 -6.095* 108.783* -0.134
4openi,t -9.117* 158.674* -1.896 -8.922* 152.996* -1.848
4toti,t -10.369* 186.413* -1.132 -10.729* 195.525* -0.887
Notes : See notes table 3.
The IPS and MW tests strongly reject the null hypothesis of non stationarity in the panel for all
series at the 5 % significance level. In this case, we can follow the LM-Hadri conclusions since Hlouskova
and Wagner’s (2005) simulations showed that it is more designed to find unit root. For all variables, the
LM statistic is below the right tail 5 % critical value of a standard distribution (1.64) so we are able to
accept the null hypothesis of stationarity.
In summary, we can conclude that the real exchange rate and all its potential long run determinants,
except the terms of trade are integrated of order one (order zero for financial capital inflows and the
terms of trade for the period 1970 - 2006). In other words, real exchange rates in Latin America follow
28One possible explanation of this common evolution of FDI across Latin America countries can be the incapability of
financial markets to discriminate between individual creditworthiness. For example, after the Argentina 2001 crisis, FDI
flows dropped in 2002 for 29.06 % in Argentina, 42.9 % in Brazil, 38.4 % in Chile and 38.6 % in Mexico.
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random walks, implying that deviations from PPP can be permanent. These deviations can be explained
by fundamentals’ fluctuations.
4.3 Heterogenous Cointegration : all Sample Results
In this section, we first apply Pedroni’s (2003) cointegration tests to find evidence of heterogeneous
long run relationships amongst the real exchange rate and its determinants, and second by using the
group-mean FMOLS estimator we can estimate efficiently the influence of each determinants on the real
exchange rate. Due to the variety of possible explanatory variables, we consider different specifications
of the long run real exchange rate model :
model 1 : qi,t = αi + β (gi,t, prodi,t, toti,t, openi,t, regi,t) + εi,t,
model 2 : qi,t = αi + β (gi,t, prodi,t, toti,t, openi,t, regi,t, fcii,t) + εi,t,
model 3 : qi,t = αi + β (gi,t, prodi,t, toti,t, openi,t, regi,t, fdii,t) + εi,t,
model 4 : qi,t = αi + β (gi,t, prodi,t, toti,t, openi,t, regi,t, fcii,t, fdii,t) + εi,t,
model 5 : qi,t = αi + β (gi,t, prodi,t, toti,t, openi,t, regi,t, nfai,t) + εi,t,
where αi is the fixed effects, β = (β1, β2, β3, . . .)′ is the vector of coefficients and εi,t the residual. The
term αi captures the country specificity and is needed in regressions because both real exchange rates,
productivity differentials and terms of trade are expressed as indexes and hence are not comparable in
levels across countries. We consider the model 1 as the framework. This model includes as regressors :
the ratio of government spending to GDP, a productivity effect, the terms of trade, the degree of openness
and the de facto exchange rate regime. Athukorala and Rajapatirana (2003) showed that the composition
of capital flows matters in determining their influence on the real exchange rate. Thus, we examine here
the impact of two types of capital flows : net foreign direct investment (fdii,t) and foreign capital inflows
(fcii,t). In a first time, we test the magnitude of each category of capital inflows separately (model 2 and
3). Then, net foreign direct investment and foreign capital inflows are included together in the regression
(model 4). Finally, the variable net foreign assets is added to the regression (model 5). Recently, several
studies29 found a transfer effect, i.e. in the long run net foreign assets improvements are associated with
real exchange rate appreciations, thus we expect β6 to be positive in the model 5.
According to our real exchange rate’s definition (an increase in qi,t implies an appreciation of the
domestic currency), we would expect β1 > 0, β2 > 0, β3 ≷ 0, β4 < 0, β5 > 0. Assuming that government
spending fall more on non traded goods, an increase in public consumption will rise total demand for non
traded goods and thus rising its relative price and the real exchange rate. The coefficient β2 measures
the impact of the Balassa-Samuelson effect which claims that an increase of traded sector productivity
relative to non traded sector should appreciate the real exchange rate. Theoretically, the influence on
real exchange rate of the terms of trade is ambiguous since a terms of trade improvement generates
two contrary effects (income versus substitution). Consequently, the impact of terms of trade on real
exchange rate depends whether the income or substitution effect dominates. An increase in the openness
degree leads to a convergence of international prices, limiting pressure on the real exchange rate. Hence,
a greater openness to trade, through trade-liberalizing reforms for example, is expected to lead to a
depreciation of the real exchange rate (β4 < 0). The exchange rate regime should affect the real exchange
rate mainly through a boom of the consumption of non traded goods which entails an increase of the non
traded goods’ price, so we expect that rigid exchange rate regimes lead to real exchange rate appreciation
(i.e. β5 > 0). Finally, coefficients of capital flows in models 2, 3 and 4 (β6 and β7 in model 4) are expected
to be positively signed.
Before estimating the long-run exchange rate models, we perform a correlation analysis. We focus
on the bivariate correlation between, first real exchange rate and its fundamentals (column 2 of table 5
below), and second between the different long run determinants of the real exchange rate (columns 3-8).
Bivariate correlations between the determinants of the real exchange rates allow us to identify potential
collinearity among the explanatory variables included in models 1-5. Multicollinearity problems can
29See Calderon (2002), Alberola et al. (2003), Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al. (2004), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004), Aguirre and
Caldero´n (2005) and Dufrenot and Yehoue (2005).
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adversely affect the estimating cointegrating vector βˆ and t-statistics. Panel bivariate correlations, noted
R¯(x, y), are computed as follows : in a first time we compute individual bivariate correlations, noted rxyi ,
between variables x and y for country i, then we average the absolute value of rxyi across the N dimension
that is, R¯(x, y) = N−1
∑N
i=1 |rxyi |. Note that, this construction of R¯(x, y) provides an indicator of the
magnitude of the correlation between variables x and y, and do not permit to determine the sign of the
correlation since it is calculated on absolute values of individual correlations. As shown in table 5, the
real exchange rate is strongly correlated with the government spending, the productivity effect, terms of
trade, the degree of openness and the de facto exchange rate regime. We can also find a strong correlation
between financial capital inflows and the productivity effect (R¯(prod, fci) = 0.34). In a recent report,
IMF (2005) stressed the importance of external financial flows as an important element in fuelling Latin
America growth, and particulary since the early 90’s where a large part of capital inflows were composed of
portfolio investments. Terms of trade and the productivity variable are strongly correlated (R¯(prod, tot)
= 0.36). This huge link was also found by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) for their panel of 42 developing
countries (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995 and Mendoza, 1997 for related literature on the link between
growth and terms of trade). Foreign direct investment are strongly linked with government spending and
the openness. Finally, the variable net foreign assets is correlated with a majority of real exchange rate’s
determinants : the Balassa-Samuelson effect, terms of trade, the degree of openness, the de facto regime
and financial capital inflows30.
Table 5: Cross-sectional correlations R¯(x, y) (1970 - 2006)
qi,t gi,t prodi,t toti,t openi,t regi,t fcii,t fdii,t nfai,t
qi,t 1.00
gi,t 0.41 1.00
prodi,t 0.45 0.30 1.00
toti,t 0.36 0.27 0.36 1.00
openi,t 0.40 0.36 0.33 0.35 1.00
regi,t 0.38 0.29 0.27 0.25 0.21 1.00
fcii,t 0.32 0.22 0.34 0.23 0.33 0.27 1.00
fdii,t 0.32 0.43 0.29 0.25 0.42 0.16 0.22 1.00
nfai,t 0.35 0.28 0.51 0.44 0.46 0.36 0.48 0.26 1.00
According to our correlation analysis, a large part of determinants of the real exchange rate are
correlated each other. Thus, in order to obtain consistent estimates of the cointegrating vector βˆ and to
reduce possible collinearity among explanatory variables, the variables toti,t, fcii,t and fdii,t enter into
models 1-5 with one lag. This strategy allows us to obtain robust results since it increases the exogeneity
of regressors included into cointegration regressions. Table 6 reports estimates of models 1-5 based on
the group-mean FMOLS estimator.
The last row of table 6 reports the group parametric-t test, Z˜∗tN,T , of cointegration proposed by
Pedroni (1999, 2004). In all five regressions, the statistic test is significant and clearly indicates a
rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration31. Hence, there is strong support for a cointegration
relationship between real exchange rate and its determinants. Moreover, all our coefficient estimates are
highly statistically significant at the 5 % significance level with the expected signs.
For all variables, coefficient estimates have the sign predicted by the theoretical literature. First, a
permanent increase in government expenditure as a share of GDP tends to appreciate the real exchange
rate in the long run. This result supports the theoretical prediction that government spending are
mainly composed of non traded goods. Our estimates suggest that the elasticity of real exchange rate
to government spending changes fluctuates around the 0.29 - 0.42 range. These estimations are fairly
close to recent studies of real exchange rate behavior in developing countries. Thus, Dufrenot and Yehou
(2005) found a coefficient βˆ1 fluctuating about 0.15 - 0.19, whereas Aguirre and Caldero´n (2005) found
an elasticity of 0.22 for their panel of 38 developing countries. However, our estimates remain relatively
high in comparison to Drine and Rault (2003) study (βˆ1 = 0.10) who considered a group of 17 countries
of Latin America over the period 1973 - 1996.
According to theoretical models of equilibrium real exchange rates a permanent change in terms of
trade has an ambiguous impact on the real exchange since it generates two contrary effects. In our
five regressions, the coefficient of terms of trade is positive and statistically significant at the 5 % level.
Terms of trade improvements entail real exchange rate appreciations in Latin America with an elasticity
of 0.16 in average, which means that the income effect is predominant. In addition, there is a strong
30On the link between terms of trade and net foreign assets, see, for example, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004).
31Note that we were able to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration when in the five models the variables toti,t,
fcii,t and fdii,t were contemporaneous to the others.
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relation between real exchange rates and the degree of openness. The coefficient βˆ3 appeared strongly
significant and negative in all models, this result indicates that liberalization of commercial policy lead
to real depreciations. The estimated elasticity for openness is quite stable among the regressions with
a coefficient close to −0.35. This value is comparable with that of Elbadawi (1994) and Dufrenot and
Yehou (2005).
Table 6: Long-run determinants of real exchange rates : group-mean FMOLS results
All countries (N = 19 and T = 37)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
gi,t 0.369*** 0.321*** 0.327*** 0.286** 0.420***
(5.41) (5.16) (5.32) (2.10) (5.77)
prodi,t 0.548*** 0.534*** 0.631*** 0.585*** 0.449***
(6.87) (5.56) (7.03) (5.78) (4.96)
toti,t−1 0.162*** 0.164*** 0.141*** 0.150*** 0.164**
(2.92) (2.69) (3.29) (3.36) (2.04)
openi,t -0.308*** -0.349*** -0.370*** -0.404*** -0.364***
(-7.21) (-7.88) (-6.91) (-7.87) (-8.73)
regi,t 0.267*** 0.260*** 0.252*** 0.245*** 0.229***
(12.29) (12.19) (11.96) (12.02) (10.22)
fcii,t−1 0.622* 0.660*
(1.71) (1.65)
fdii,t−1 2.972** 2.649*
(2.05) (1.92)
nfai,t 0.121***
(2.68)
Z˜∗tN,T -4.362*** -3.530*** -4.224*** -2.167** -3.798***
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. * (respectively **, ***) : rejection of the null hypothesis at 10 %
significance level (respectively 5 % and 1 %).
Moreover, our empirical results confirm that rigid de facto exchange rate regimes tend to appreciate
the real exchange rate. Hence, the exchange rate regime is not neutral regarding its effects on real
exchange rate. This non neutrality contrasts with the view of many authors (see Flood and Rose, 1995,
and Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000) which state that the exchange rate regime is neutral regarding the
evolution and the volatility of real macroeconomic variables.
The estimated coefficients of both types of capital inflows are positive and statistically significant
at the 5 % level, implying that a surge in foreign capital flows are accompanied by real exchange rate
appreciations in Latin America. The positive coefficients βˆ6 and βˆ7 in model 4 suggest that an increase
in net capital inflows rises domestic absorption and induces a reallocation of output factors towards non
traded sector. This shift in the composition of output exercises an upward pressure on the price of non
traded goods and thus appreciates the real exchange rate. However, the impact on the real exchange
rate of the two categories of capital inflows exhibit different elasticity magnitudes. According to models
3 to 4 results, the real exchange rate appreciates about 2.8 % following a permanent 1 % rise in FDI
flows as share of GDP, whereas an increase of 1 % in portfolio investments inflows (as share of GDP)
leads to a real exchange appreciation of 0.6 %. Our estimates are quite different from those estimated
by Athukorala and Rajapatirana (2003) who found an elasticity about 1.70 for financial capital flows
and -0.06 for foreign direct investment. These differences can be partially explained by methodologies
employed in their study comparing to this one. Indeed, they focused only on a restrict group of six
countries in Latin America32 over the period 1985-2000.
The results concerning net foreign assets confirm a significant transfer effect, that is, permanent
improvements in net foreign assets tend to appreciate the real exchange rate in the long run. Our net
32Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
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foreign assets coefficient estimate is 0.121, which is close to those obtained by Caldero´n (2002), and Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2004), respectively 0.15 - 0.22 and 0.19 - 0.29 ranges.
4.4 Heterogenous Cointegration : Sample Splits Results
In this section, we run the FMOLS regressions for country subgroups. The entire sample is split according
to geographical criteria. We divide our sample in two areas : South America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) and Caribbean and Central America
(Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama and
Trinidad and Tobago). This methodology is applied in order to take account of a possible heterogeneity
between the two zones. It is possible to think that the two groups have specific characteristics in trade,
productive structure and external financial linkages, specially with the dollar area.
As a previous analysis, panel unit roots are implemented for sub samples series. Results are displayed
in appendix B, table 13. As in the whole sample case, we are able to reject the null hypothesis of non
stationarity for the variable terms of trade for any group split and for any specification of this variable.
According to IPS and MW results, this implies that the terms of trade are integrated of order zero.
For Caribbean and Central America sub-group, all other variables are stationary at the 5 % significance
level. In the South America sample, the IPS and MW tests applied to original series indicate that the null
hypothesis of non stationarity can not be rejected for all variables, except for terms of trade, portfolio
inflows and foreign direct investment. Moreover, when controlling for cross sectional dependence, portfolio
inflows and foreign direct investment variables reject the null of non stationarity, implying for a possible
common trend that driven the evolution of these two variables across the individual dimension33.
Table 7: Long-run determinants of real exchange rates : group-mean FMOLS results
South America (N = 10 and T = 37)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
gi,t 0.499*** 0.410*** 0.393*** 0.327*** 0.531***
(3.77) (3.40) (3.35) (3.04) (4.95)
prodi,t 0.682*** 0.699*** 0.837*** 0.806*** 0.580***
(4.92) (4.63) (5.61) (5.30) (5.60)
toti,t−1 0.315*** 0.297*** 0.232*** 0.213** 0.180***
(2.82) (2.39) (2.53) (2.11) (2.68)
openi,t -0.378*** -0.394*** -0.458*** -0.460*** -0.524***
(-4.30) (-3.79) (-4.88) (-4.46) (-6.48)
regi,t 0.286*** 0.284*** 0.267*** 0.266*** 0.274***
(6.54) (6.41) (6.44) (6.32) (6.34)
fcii,t−1 0.891 0.894
(0.96) (0.89)
fdii,t−1 2.599 2.264
(1.43) (1.23)
nfai,t -0.566***
(-2.85)
Z˜∗tN,T -2.325*** -1.297* -1.949** -0.969 -2.275**
Notes : See notes table 6.
The estimation results for the South America group are reported in table 7. In model 1, all coeffi-
cient estimates are significant at the 1 % level and have the expected sign. Furthermore, the Pedroni’s
cointegration test statistics is significant, hence there is evidence for cointegration hypothesis.
In models 1, 2, 3 and 5, we are also able to reject the null of no cointegration at least at the 10 %
significance level. However, in models 3 and 4, financial capital inflows and foreign direct investments
33However, as we will see latter, these two variables are not significant in cointegration relations and thus the issue of
mixed regressions (i.e. regressions with both I(1) and I(0) variables) is not matter in this case.
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are not significant. Finally, in model 5 we see that all regressors are significant, and regarding the net
foreign assets variable, the coefficient is now negative.
Table 8 reports estimates of models 1-5 for Caribbean and Central America group. In model 1, one
variable is not statistically significant : the terms of trade. For many countries in Central America, the
terms of trade fluctuations are instead an important source of exogenous fluctuations in the GDP. When
the terms of trade variable is removed from equation (model 1b), the others variables remains similar.It is
possible that in the Caribbean and Central America case it could be interesting to disentangle the separate
effects of exports prices and imports prices, given the particular characteristics of these economies (most
of them very small and mono-producers). Model 2 supports the hypothesis of cointegration between the
real exchange rate and fundamentals like government spending, the Balassa Samuelson effect, the degree
of openness, the exchange rate regime and portfolio inflows. All coefficients are statistically significant
with the expected sign, with the exception of the portfolio inflows variable .An increase of public spending,
productivity, trade liberalization and a surge in foreign direct investments tend to appreciate the real
exchange rates in the Caribbean and Central America group. Like in the South America case, rigid
de facto exchange rate regimes lead to an upward pressure on the real exchange rate. However, the
coefficient is less stronger here than previously, the implication is that fixed regimes tend to appreciate
more the real exchange rate in South America group than in Caribbean and Central America zone. In
models 3 and 4, we can reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration, foreign direct investments have an
impact on the real exchange rate in the long run. Results of model 5 confirm the existence of the transfer
effect in Caribbean and Central America countries : improving net external positions are associated with
appreciating real exchange rates. This evidence contrasts with the opposite relation found it in South
America.
Table 8: Long-run determinants of real exchange rates : group-mean FMOLS results
Caribbean and Central America (N = 9 and T = 37)
Model 1 Model 1b Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
gi,t 0.226*** 0.178*** 0.190*** 0.140*** 0.152*** 0.249**
(3.88) (3.24) (3.82) (2.89) (3.07) (3.51)
prodi,t 0.399*** 0.265*** 0.225* 0.289*** 0.252* 0.216**
(4.80) (3.19) (1.95) (3.17) (1.78) (2.26)
toti,t−1 -0.007
(-1.26)
openi,t -0.231*** -0.311*** -0.346*** -0.259*** -0.310*** -0.332***
(-5.94) (-6.58) (-7.37) (-5.90) (-6.93) (-7.97)
regi,t 0.247*** 0.254*** 0.239*** 0.234*** 0.225*** 0.171***
(10.96) (10.66) (10.45) (10.33) (10.18) (7.56)
fcii,t−1 0.350 0.192
(1.13) (0.60)
fdii,t−1 -2.294*** -1.992*
(-2.49) (-1.93)
nfai,t 0.362***
(4.34)
Z˜∗tN,T -1.908** -3.127*** -3.497*** -2.801*** -3.106*** -3.334***
Notes : See notes table 6.
In summary, our results support the hypothesis of cointegration between the real exchange rate
and a set of real variables that includes a Balassa-Samuelson effect, government spending, the degree
of openness, foreign capital inflow (particulary foreign direct investments), net foreign assets and the
nominal exchange rate regime. However, sub-sample regressions showed that exchange rate responses
to real shocks are different in Latin America and in Central America. In both zones, the long run
real exchange rate responds to the government spending, the Balassa-Samuelson effect, changes in the
openness degree, net foreign assets and the nominal exchange regime. Nevertheless, fixed regimes and
trade restrictions in South America generate greater real appreciations than in Caribbean and Central
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America.
Others real factors seem to be region specific. An improvement of the terms of trade entail a real
appreciation in South American countries. On the other hand, net foreign assets has an opposite effect
in South America than in Caribbean and Central America.
4.5 Equilibrium Exchange Rates and Misalignments
From our estimates, we compute the equilibrium real exchange rate, q¯t using sustainable values of the
fundamentals, that is, q¯t = βˆ′X
p
t where X
p
t is the permanent part of fundamentals and βˆ′ the FMOLS
vector of coefficients. Here we extract the permanent component of fundamentals using the Hodrick and
Prescott filter. Misalignments or deviations between the current real exchange and its equilibrium level
are therefore measured by :
qdt = qt − q¯t
According to our real exchange rate construction, if qdt > 0 it would suggest that the actual real exchange
rate is overvalued. Similarly, the real exchange rate is undervalued when qdt < 0.
In order to compute consistent estimations for equilibrium exchange rates in our panel, we retain
coefficients estimates from subgroups regressions. Indeed, since these estimations are more country spe-
cific than estimations for the whole panel, we expect to obtain more precise misalignment measures. In
both cases, we retain a version of model 5, that includes as fundamentals the government spending, the
Balassa-Samuelson effect, the terms of trade, the trade openness, and the net foreign assets for South
America countries. In the case of Caribbean and Central America countries, a version of model 5 con-
taining as fundamentals government spending, the Balassa-Samuelson effect, the trade openness and the
net foreign assets. In fact, the model 5 is very similar in both geographic areas with four regressors in
common and permits comparisons. For the South America zone, models 2 to 4 can not be used in order
to provide consistent estimations for equilibrium exchange rates because there is no cointegration relation
in model 4, and in models 2 and 3 the variables fcii,t and fdii,t are not significant. The same arguments
hold for Caribbean and Central America estimations (no cointegration in models 3 and 4)34.
Table 9 presents real exchange rate deviations from equilibrium for 200635. Eight currencies over
nineteen are close to their equilibrium level in 2006, indeed the misalignment is less than ±10% which
can be interpreted as an equilibrium situation under cyclical circumstances. For countries like Ecuador
Honduras and Jamaica, the deviation is even less than 4 %. This finding contrasts with undervalued
currencies for which the undervaluation is in average about 43.2 %. The table shows a very large un-
dervaluation in Bolivia and Paraguay. On the other hand, big countries as Brazil and Mexico exhibit a
huge overvaluation in 2006 with a deviation of 45.1 % and 27.9 % respectively. El Salvador, Guatemala
Venezuela and Peru’s real exchange rates are also strongly above their equilibrium level.
Table 9: Real Exchange Rate Misalignments in 2006
Undervalued currencies Equilibrated currencies Overvalued currencies
Bolivia -78.6 % Argentina -6.2 % Brazil 45.1 %
Dominican Rep -13.5 % Colombia -5.5 % El Salvador 42.0 %
Panama -14.6 % Costa Rica -6.9 % Guatemala 25.2 %
Paraguay -66.0 % Chile -10.0 % Mexico 27.9 %
Ecuador 3.2 % Peru 51.6 %
Honduras 3.1 % Uruguay 15.3 %
Jamaica 2.2 % Venezuela 31.4 %
Trinidad & T. -5.2 %
Notes : A currency is designed as equilibrated if the misalignment is less than ±10%.
Real exchange rate misalignments are often used as a leading indicator of currency crises (Kaminsky et
al., 1997 and Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998). It has been showed that real exchange rate overvaluations
provide an early warning indicator of possible currency crashes. Real appreciations of the domestic
currency can signal potential problems in the current account position. Moreover, since the real exchange
rate guides the internal resource allocation, a persistent overvaluation induces a non optimal allocation
between sectors of production. In order to test the efficiency of our model specification as a leading
indicator of crisis, we compare the misalignment level before a currency crisis with the misalignment
observed after the crash. Currency crises are detected using the analysis of Frankel and Rose (1996)36.
34Misalignments were also computed using model 1 in both zones and model 5 in Caribbean and Central America group.
Results, not reported here to conserve space, are very close to those of model 2.
35Misalignments for each country over the period 1970 - 2006 are reported in appendix, table 14, page 28.
36They define a currency crash as a large change of the nominal exchange rate that is also a substantial increase in the
rate of change of nominal depreciation.
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The table 10 presents the evolution of misalignments before and after several currency crises that occurred
in Latin America and captures a number of interesting features. First, our results show that real exchange
rates were strongly overvalued the years that precede the crisis, the misalignment reaches his peak the
year just before the crisis (except for Brazil, 1999 and Uruguay, 2002). In this sense, our equilibrium
real exchange rate estimates confirm the hypothesis that real exchange rate misalignments can be used
to prevent currency crises.
Table 10: Real Exchange Rate Misalignments and Currency Crises
Country Crisis Year (= t) t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
Argentina 1975 92.47 100.00 -260.07 -207.03 -160.31
Argentina 1981 45.66 100.00 28.98 -225.22 -203.10
Argentina 2002 91.95 100.00 -60.64 34.06 38.64
Bolivia 1982 42.60 100.00 -91.84 36.83 7.47
Brazil 1999 108.41 100.00 52.42 56.03 41.74
Chile 1982 71.86 100.00 64.44 77.28 80.06
Costa Rica 1981 88.35 100.00 -367.35 -82.46 -22.51
Dominican Rep. 1985 60.43 100.00 -41.11 -15.15 -148.47
El Salvador 1986 5.65 100.00 -156.21 -41.38 78.17
El Salvador 1990 40.62 100.00 10.99 23.10 2.24
Guatemala 1986 59.32 100.00 -161.28 -149.67 -144.16
Honduras 1990 71.56 100.00 -157.26 -48.55 -38.80
Jamaica 1978 97.24 100.00 -5.74 30.07 65.70
Mexico 1994 73.74 100.00 -63.84 -94.09 11.56
Paraguay 1984 82.65 100.00 74.45 56.58 -14.03
Uruguay 1990 21.91 100.00 -69.86 4.44 55.36
Uruguay 2002 153.95 100.00 -30.40 -114.43 46.63
Venezuela 1984 63.27 100.00 -26.77 3.10 -278.86
Venezuela 2002 94.66 100.00 32.89 50.79 48.20
Notes : The year t refers to the beginning of the crisis. The misalignments are expressed as
an index (100 = t-1). In every case, the misalignment is positive in year t- 1. A sign + (-)
indicates an overvaluation (undervaluation) of the real exchange rate.
Second, estimates from model 2 indicate that following the crisis, the real exchange rate tends to
undershoot for a short period its equilibrium level, i.e. after the crisis the real exchange is undervalued.
For example after the 1994 crisis in Mexico, the peso was strongly below its equilibrium rate in years
1994 and 1995. After the initial strong undervaluation, the real exchange rate appreciates and converges
towards its equilibrium rate (see Bolivia, 1982, Costa Rica, 1981 and Uruguay, 1990 for example). Third,
the effect of devaluations on initial misalignment is country specific. Some nominal devaluations permit
to well correct the pre-crisis overvaluation (Venezuela, 2002, El Salvador, 1990, and Jamaica, 1978),
whereas in Brazil (1999) and Paraguay (1984) the devaluation reduces only partially the gap between the
current real exchange rate and its equilibrium level. In these cases, the real exchange rate continues to
be overvaluated despite a nominal devaluation.
Finally, regarding the Argentinean convertibility regime, the table 11 shows a high degree of real
exchange rate appreciation when the currency board was introduced in April 1991. At this time, the
peso exhibited an overvaluation of 42.7 %. After 1993, the overvaluation began to decline and persisted
around 30 % during the period 1995 - 1998. This is consistent with the appreciation of the Brazilian real
over those years following the implementation of the Real Plan (see table 14)37. The gap between the
peso and its equilibrium level accentuated after the 1999 Brazilian devaluation (the misalignment jumped
from 31.4 % in 1998 to 41.2 % in 1999) and reached 46.3 % in 2001 just before the collapse of the regime
in December 2001. Note that our pre-crisis misalignment, 46.3 % is in line with those found by Gay and
Pellegrini (2004) and Alberola et al. (2004), 44 % and 53 % respectively. Williamson’s (1995) analysis
on the currency board system show its difficulty to correct endogenously an initial real exchange rate
misalignment. The initial overvaluation and the incapability of the currency board to correct it led to
a persistent peso’s overvaluation and to a dramatic loss in competitiveness which in turn weakened the
convertibility regime38.
37Note that Brazil is the first trading partner for Argentina and thus the Brazilian real enter with an important weight
when constructing the real effective exchange rate of Argentina (about 33 % over the period 1990 - 2006).
38See Carrera (2002) for a general discussion of the currency board experience in Argentina.
21
Table 11: Misalignment of the Argentinean peso
Year Misalignment Year Misalignment
1991 + 42.7 % 1999 + 41.2 %
1992 + 56.5 % 2000 + 42.6 %
1993 + 63.1 % 2001 + 46.3 %
1994 + 43.6 % 2002 - 28.1 %
1995 + 32.8 % 2003 - 15.8 %
1996 + 29.4 % 2004 - 17.9 %
1997 + 31.5 % 2005 - 11.5 %
1998 + 31.4 % 2006 - 6.2 %
Notes : + = overvaluation, - = undervaluation.
5 Conclusions
The main goal of this paper was to determinate what factors influence real exchange rates in nineteen
Latin American countries over the 1970 - 2006 period. Using panel cointegration techniques, we estimated
several models of real exchange rate according to fundamentals that are included in regressions. Referring
to the theoretical literature, six traditional fundamentals retain our attention : the Balassa-Samuelson
effect, government spending, the terms of trade, the country’s openness to international trade, foreign
capital inflows and the net foreign assets position. In addition, we also include the de facto nominal
exchange regime as a factor determining the evolution of real exchanges rates in Latin America. Hence,
we follow the methodology proposed by Coudert and Dubert (2005) to identify the de facto regime. After,
we divide our countries sample in two subgroups, that is South America (ten countries) and Caribbean
and Central America (nine countries). We ran long run regressions in both subgroups and found some
interesting differences. Finally, we estimate the equilibrium levels real exchange rates and compute the
degree of misalignment.
The main empirical results are the following. First, there is a strong evidence that, over the long
run, Latin America’s real exchanges rates are non stationary implying that PPP does not hold in this
region. This result is in line with the findings of Edwards and Savastano (1999) who claim that recent
studies focusing on real exchange rates in Latin America do not support the hypothesis of PPP. Thus,
real shocks have a permanent effect on the real exchange rates’ paths.
Second, we identify six real factors which have a potential effect on real exchange rates. Estimations
for the whole sample (nineteen countries) confirm the theoretical links between the real exchange rate
and its determinants. That is, a higher government spending to GDP ratio, an increase in productivity
differential, a positive terms of trade shock, a surge in foreign capital flows and an higher net foreign
assets position affect positively the real exchange rate in Latin America. Whereas an increase in trade
openness leads to an depreciation of the real exchange rate. The de facto exchange regime has also a
strong influence on real exchange rates in Latin America : rigid regimes (peg or crawling peg) exercise an
upward pressure on the real exchange rate. This stylized fact has been also highlighted by IMF (2005),
exchange rate stabilization programs in Latin America at the beginning 90’s introduced inflation stickiness
which in turn leads to an increase of the real exchange rate. This finding shows the non neutrality of
exchange rate regime regarding its effects on real exchange rates whatever the credibility’s level of the
fixed regime. The tendency of fixed regime to appreciate the real exchange rate can be seen as an adverse
effect of exchange rate stabilization implementations in Latin America.
Third, there is evidence that real exchange rates behaviors are different between South America and
Caribbean and Central America. Some fundamentals play a role in only one of the two subgroups, foreign
direct investment matter for Caribbean and Central America area solely, whereas the terms of trade is
significant only in South America countries. Regarding the magnitude of FMOLS coefficients, there are
also differences between the two zones. Fixed regimes and trade restrictions policies are associated with
greater appreciations in South America than in Caribbean and Central America.
Fourth, our equilibrium real exchange rates estimations confirm that persistent overvaluation can
provide a strongly early warning for currencies crises in Latin America. A large number of currency
crises experienced by Latin American countries were preceded by huge and persistent overvaluations.
This finding has an important policy implication for countries with a fixed de facto regime. Our nominal
regime classification shows that in 2006, sixteen countries maintained a de facto fixed regime (peg or
crawling peg)39. El Salvador and Peru exhibit significant and persistent overvaluations since 1998, with
an average gap between actual real exchange rate and its equilibrium level about 39.0 % and 44.60 %
39Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Ja-
maica, Mexico, Panama, and Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.
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respectively. For countries like Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, and Trinidad
and Tobago, the real exchange rate observed in 2006 was in line with its equilibrium level (see tables 9
and 14).
Moreover, our model specification offers explanations for the recent currency history of Argentina. The
last three important devaluations experiences in 1974, 1980 and 2001 were preceded by high real exchange
rate overvaluations : 49.1 % , 50.6 % and 46.3 % respectively. As shown by Edwards (1994), expansive
and inconsistent policies can generate, under a fixed regime, persistent overvaluation, and when there is
a real exchange misalignment, nominal devaluations can be a powerful tool to restore equilibrium.
Finally, further research might attempt to improve our empirical analysis by taking account of others
shocks that influence real exchange rates in Latin America. Specially in the Central America case,
remittances from United States represent a growing part of income for countries like Dominican Republic,
El Salvador and Honduras. Even for a “big”country like Mexico they are an important part of his money
inflows. These flows reached, on average 12 % of GDP in El Salvador during the 90’s, and 3 % of GDP in
Honduras (source : IMF, 2005). Since the beginning of the 90’s, remittances exhibit an upward tendency,
so we can expect that it will play an increasing influence on real exchange rates in the future.
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Appendix
A The de facto exchange rate regime classification :
The classification process of Coudert and Dubert (2005) can be summarized as follows :
1. Step 1 : Assessing annual trend in the exchange rate
By using monthly exchange rates (against U.S. dollar), the annual trend is extracted from the
following regression :
ln et = α+ γ time + εt
where ln et is the logarithm of the monthly nominal exchange rate against the U.S. dollar, time is a
linear trend and εt the residual term. The annual trend of the year j , denoted by βj is constructed
from the OLS estimator of γ as βˆj = (1 + γˆ)12 − 1. If βˆj is found positive, series of monthly
exchange rates are detrended (e˜t designed the detrended exchange rate). If the annual trend is
negative, its absolute value, |βˆj |, is compared to an arbitrarily threshold τ . Following Coudert and
Dubert (2005), τ is set to 2 % annually.
2. Step 2 : Comparing exchange rate variances
The second step consists in comparing the annual variance of changes in 4et (or 4e˜t if βj is
found positive in step one) to the average variance of a benchmark floating currencies. The bench-
mark sample of floating currencies is made up of the Japanese Yen, the British Pound and the
German Deutsche Mark (after 1999, the euro stands in for the deutsche mark). By considering a
floating currencies benchmark, we can compute Fisher tests applied to variance of nominal exchange
rates.
Let s2i denote the empirical annual variance of 4et for the Latin America country i and s2B the
average of annual variance of the benchmark. Assuming that annual variances follow normal dis-
tributions with theoretical variance σ2i for the Latin America country and σ
2
B for the benchmark
group, then the ratio (s2B/σ
2
B)/(s
2
i /σ
2
i ) follows a Fisher distribution F (nB , ni) where nB and ni
designate degrees of freedom. Since s2i and s
2
i are respectively calculated with 36 and 12 data nB
is equal to 35 and ni to 11. The null hypothesis is, for a given year, the variance of exchange
rate changes in the Latin America country is smaller than the one in the benchmark panel, that is
H0 : σ2i < σ
2
B . Note that the 5 % critical value of an F (35, 11) is 2.54. If s
2
i < (1/2.54) s
2
B , the
exchange rate variance of the country i is considered as low. If s2i ≥ (1/2.54) s2B , the variance of
the country i is considered as high.
3. Step 3 : Comparing changes in international reserves variances
In this stage we compute the same test as in second step to variance of changes in official re-
serves (4R). Thus, changes in foreign reserves empirical variance for the Latin America country i
(denoted by s˜2i with a theoretical value σ˜
2
i ) will be compared to the average variance of changes in
foreign reserves in the benchmark sample (noted s˜2B with a theoretical value σ˜
2
B). Assuming that
monthly rates of change in reserves follow normal distributions, a new Fisher test can be computed.
In this case, the null hypothesis is, for a given year, the variance of the reserves change in Latin
America country σ˜2i is greater than the one in the benchmark group σ˜
2
B , that is H0 : σ˜
2
i > σ˜
2
B . Then
the ratio (s˜2i /σ˜
2
i )/(s˜
2
B/σ˜
2
B) follows a Fisher distribution F (35, 11).
If s˜2i > 2.54 s˜
2
B , the variance of international reserves is considered as high. Otherwise, if s˜
2
i ≤
2.54 s˜2B , the variance of international reserves is considered as low.
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At final, according to results in the three steps, nine cases can be distinguished :
Annual trend Exchange rate Official reserves Type of regime
variance variance
βˆ > 0 high low pure float
βˆ > 0 high high managed float
βˆ > 0 and βˆ < τ low − peg
βˆ > 0 and βˆ > τ low − crawling peg
βˆ < 0 and |β| > τ − low pure float
βˆ < 0 and |β| > τ − high managed float
βˆ < 0 and |β| < τ low − peg
βˆ < 0 and |β| < τ high low pure float
βˆ < 0 and |β| < τ high high managed float
All data on monthly nominal exchange rates and official reserves are extracted from the IMF-IFS
database.
The classification is reported in table 12.
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B Panel unit root tests in sample splits
Table 13: Panel unit root tests results : sample splits
Original series Demeaned series
IPS MW LM IPS MW LM
South America (N = 10)
qi,t -1.522 27.819 4.363* -1.472 28.708 4.865*
gi,t -0.765 20.635 3.588* -1.209 26.620 4.307*
prodi,t 0.638 16.320 5.774* -0.254 21.353 6.847*
fcii,t -2.608* 35.987* 1.083 -2.600* 33.917* 2.019*
fdii,t -1.743* 31.554* 2.178* -0.835 25.654 5.192*
nfai,t -1.399 22.146 4.542* 0.405 21.507 5.519*
openi,t -1.336 32.536* 4.563* -1.398 27.296 4.839*
toti,t -3.784* 59.899* 5.305* -4.674* 67.433* 5.400*
4qi,t -6.747* 86.888* -1.328 -7.128* 91.583* -1.256
4gi,t -5.491* 74.958* -1.076 -6.856* 92.793* -0.996
4prodi,t -4.359* 55.266* 0.690 -4.536* 57.479* 1.453
4fcii,t -7.253* 93.365* -2.073 -8.124* 105.632* -2.022
4fdii,t -5.535* 71.753* -0.842 -6.207* 80.565* -0.166
4nfai,t -4.554* 58.422* -0.675 -5.102* 65.774* -0.460
4openi,t -6.629* 84.403* -1.461 -6.733* 84.113* -1.479
4toti,t -7.607* 101.390* 0.024 -7.579* 101.269* -0.048
Caribbean and Central America (N = 9)
qi,t 0.403 11.972 5.226* -0.123 14.637 4.938*
gi,t -0.456 15.691 4.166* 0.001 13.986 4.073*
prodi,t 0.596 10.572 5.403* -0.179 15.782 5.378*
fcii,t -0.860 19.657 2.776* 1.797* 27.097 2.073*
fdii,t -1.127 23.548 6.303* -1.062 20.166 4.454*
nfai,t 2.358 7.103 7.206* -0.574 12.951 5.269*
openi,t -0.027 15.145 5.956* -0.237 16.274 6.012*
toti,t -2.244* 28.943* 2.929* -2.344* 32.883* 2.867*
4qi,t -5.115* 60.389* -1.241 -5.053* 60.644* -1.317
4gi,t -3.301* 38.885* -0.134 -3.037* 38.167* -0.330
4prodi,t -3.612* 42.294* -0.294 -4.797* 58.118* -0.033
4fcii,t -6.987* 85.078* -1.497 -7.263* 87.913* -1.557
4fdii,t -6.572* 78.363* 0.751 -6.849* 77.405* -0.194
4nfai,t -2.915* 37.084* 1.233 -3.477* 43.001* 0.289
4openi,t -6.259* 75.271* -1.216 -5.866* 68.883* 1.126
4toti,t -7.046* 85.023* -1.671 -7.598* 94.256* -1.340
Notes : See notes table 3. Critical values at 5 % significance level for a χ2 are 31.41 with 2N =
20 and 28.87 with 2N = 18. * : rejection of H0 at 5 % significance level.
C Real Exchange Rate Misalignments
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